

ER 11 - 7832/a

27 September 1959

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*card*  
Mr. Norman Cousins, Editor  
Saturday Review  
25 West 45th Street  
New York 36, New York

Dear Mr. Cousins:

I appreciated your good letter of September 23 and I hope to have an opportunity for a further discussion of the general subject of your letter with you.

Cord is now on a somewhat protracted trip to the Orient but he will be back sometime in October and possibly he and I can get together with you when you are next in Washington.

Sincerely,

AWD/ji  
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# Saturday Review

11-1832

25 West 45th Street, New York 36, N. Y.

Norman Cousins, Editor

September 23, 1959

Mr. Allen W. Dulles  
Director of Central Intelligence  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Dulles:

I should have written long before to thank you for the privilege of meeting with Cord in connection with the report on Russia. During the past few weeks, however, I have been with the family on vacation and have resolutely stayed away from paper, pencils or typewriter.

Late though I am, however, I am eager to follow up on that discussion with a few observations.

The central part of my meeting with Cord turned on the Russian view of the German question. I reported to Cord the clear and emphatic impression I had, in talking to various Soviet officials, that the Russians were ready to give ground on a wide variety of issues, including the Middle East and nuclear testing, but that they drew the line on the issue of a Germany made into a nuclear fighting force. This to the Russians, I said, was an ultimate issue on which they would not retreat and were prepared for a showdown if need be. Cord seemed incredulous at this, asking whether it was reasonable to believe that the Soviet, with all its rocketry and nuclear capability, had anything to fear from a target as compressed as Germany. There is certainly logic in Cord's position, but another controlling factor has to be taken into account here. What the Soviet fears is not Germany alone but what it considers to be Germany's capability of getting into a situation that could commit the United States. Even if we view the situation in symbolic terms, we are faced with the most severe reaction, not only in Russia but in Poland and Czechoslovakia, to the prospect of a resurgent Germany with military power.

Cord's response at this point was that no one with any intimate knowledge of the situation could question the responsible character of Chancellor Adenauer. Personally, I could agree with Cord, but the issue here was not my own feelings in the matter but such information as I was attempting to convey about the Russian view. Here the undeniable fact, as the Russians see it, is that Chancellor Adenauer is well along in years and that a number of men in his cabinet might not be thinking as steadfastly in terms of European stability. An ex-Nazi in a high government post might or might not be completely re indoctrinated. Here Cord, quite properly, challenged me to name such a person. And once again, I had to remind Cord I was trying to convey an impression, and not engage in an appraisal of the validity of the Russian position.

Mr. Allen W. Dulles

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As a matter of historical fact, however, and without any attempt to assay the significance of that fact, I believe the records of the Nuremberg Trials will confirm that Hans Globke was a Regierungsrat (counselor) in the section for racial questions ("Staatsangehörigkeitsfragen") of the Ministry of the Interior. He wrote several commentaries on the Nuremberg laws. Gerhard Schroeder, now Minister of the Interior, entered the NSDAP in 1933, according to the New York Times.

I may agree with Cord as to the significance of these affiliations, but on a factual basis it is incorrect to state that no one close to the Chancellor or in a responsible position had any definite Nazi affiliation.

Moreover, the real question, to repeat, has to do with the nature of the Russian position, rational or otherwise, and the need to know when they are bluffing and when they are not.

Because of the pressure of time, I did not go into other matters with Cord which may be relevant to the situation. I should like now to comment briefly on just one of these matters.

The Soviet is willing to make peace, real peace, with the United States so far as the danger of a nuclear shooting war is concerned. They are just as intent on achieving victory over the U.S., however, as they would be if war broke out. They measure victory over us in terms of their ability to speak for or represent the majority of the world's peoples. On this level of a non-military showdown, they are mobilizing with an all-out preparedness. Instead of the Iron Curtain, we are now confronted with a Red Magnet. Everything possible is being done to attract people to the Soviet Union, especially from Asia and Africa, for the Soviet is now convinced that its gains are substantial enough to form an important showcase for peoples emerging from colonialism or feudalism.

I fear it is presumptuous of me to write to you about these things, not only because of the stark lack of originality involved in them, but because your own sources of information and analysis are so deep and varied. In any event, I am eager to thank you for the expression of your interest to place myself completely at your disposal for any further exchange.

Sincerely,



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